Havlagah

Havlagah was a policy adopted during the bloody riots of 1936-1939 towards the attacks of armed Arab gangs on the Jewish settlement in Palestine. This policy was determined by the institutions of the Yishuv, in coordination with the leadership of the Zionist movement on questions of the nature of the response to the attacks — preserving the purity of Jewish weapons by avoiding violent attacks on innocent Arabs, etc. Various circles in the Yishuv, and in particular, members of the Revisionist movement, demanded a harsh response and deterrent retaliatory actions against the Arab gangs and their aides. The dispute that escalated and spread was one of the reasons for the establishment of the Irgun Tzva’i Le’umi (Irgun) and then of the even more extreme Lehi, and for separate actions by the organizations that broke away from the Haganah. The policy of restraint was political and was imposed on the Haganah. In the early days of the bloody riots, the Haganah command prepared plans and fighters for vigorous counter-attacks after 16 Jews were murdered by Arabs in the first two days. However, the Jewish Agency and the Yishuv leadership delayed the response for political reasons, recognizing that the fate of the Yishuv was to be decided neither in the suburbs of Jaffa nor in the Nablus Mountains nor in the High Commission in Jerusalem, but in London.

The policy of containment was severe and there were sharp arguments, bitterness and despair even among the organized Yishuv and within the ranks of the Haganah. However, self-defense, rather than acts of revenge and counter-terrorism helped the Yishuv leadership achieve various achievements — the transfer of government institutions from Jaffa to Tel Aviv, the opening of a temporary port on the Tel Aviv coast, the establishment of a corps of observers that opened up great possibilities for training and defending the Yishuv, the continued immigration of Jews, and more.

Ze‘ev Jabotinsky also advocated restraint for political reasons at the time, who in the early days of the riots informed his Revisionist loyalists and their military organization "Haganah B" that efforts to recruit and arm Jewish youth should be taken into account and that their restraint would help these efforts. In his article in the newspaper Ḥazit Ha‘am, “The Yishuv’s Restraint — Until When?,” he also wrote, among other things: “Even in the actual attack, the Jews do not lose their minds, but know how to restrain themselves. Restraint is bitter and dangerous, but if it helps to act with the Mandate government, which will maintain at least the beginning of legal defense, this bitter price will be worth it. And this is the service that restraint can do for us.”

However, in contrast to the positive political value of restraint abroad, its internal effect was very destructive on the spirit of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and on the spirit of Diaspora Jewry. As the wave of wild anti-Semitism, which erupted from Nazi Germany and swept through many countries, grew stronger and stronger, masses of Jews, especially the youth, looked to the Land of Israel, to the guards and defenders, the brave settlers and fighters defending Tel Hai and Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ḥulda, and more. And here, too, in the Land of Israel, Jews were being beaten and not returning blows.

The honor of the community declined and depression took hold of the heart. The members of the Haganah were ashamed and resentful of the inaction. The restraint was gnawing at them, loosening their hands and leading to despair and demoralization. The Arabs interpreted the restraint as cowardice, and at the end, even within the ranks of the Haganah there was a growing demand to stop the restraint for a while, and some threatened to leave the ranks.