User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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=== The Economic Burden ===

Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref> In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.

== Egypt ==

Nasser knew. He knew the soviet warnings of troop concentration near Syria are false. Here are everyone who told him so:

# United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=187}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=620}}</ref> UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>

# American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup”.<ref>{{harv|Bull|1976|p=104}}</ref> Nasser knew about this report<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>

# Egyptian Chief of Staff's direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and personally surveyed the border<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=305}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.<ref>{{harv|El-Gamasy|1993|p=23}}</ref> Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”<ref>{{harv|مظهر|1990|p=110}}</ref>

# Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref>

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 === The Economic Burden ===
 Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref> In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.
+== Egypt ==
+Nasser knew. He knew the soviet warnings of troop concentration near Syria are false. Here are everyone who told him so:
+# United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=187}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=620}}</ref> UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>
+# American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup”.<ref>{{harv|Bull|1976|p=104}}</ref> Nasser knew about this report<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>
+# Egyptian Chief of Staff's direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and personally surveyed the border<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=305}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.<ref>{{harv|El-Gamasy|1993|p=23}}</ref> Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”<ref>{{harv|مظهر|1990|p=110}}</ref>
+# Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref>