User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref>

=== Failed Diplomacy and Syrian Rejection of Restraint ===

Israel repeatedly turned to diplomatic channels in an effort to curb Syrian aggression. It appealed to the United Nations (UN) Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) and to major powers, including the United States and Britain, seeking intervention to halt persistent Syrian shelling and infiltration.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=157}}</ref> These appeals aimed to stop what Israel described as “incessant Syrian shelling” of kibbutzim and settlements in northern Galilee<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> as well as guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage originating from Syrian territory.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Within a matter of months, Israel submitted approximately 120 complaints to the Security Council regarding these violations.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref>

Israeli officials also pressed Britain and the United States to persuade UN Secretary-General U Thant to call on Syria to cease its provocations<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=157}}</ref> and urged the Great Powers to issue direct condemnations. Israel even requested that the Soviet Union restrain its Syrian allies.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=158}}</ref>

Despite these efforts, Damascus not only refused to cooperate but escalated its stance. At a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee (ISMAC), the Syrian delegation withdrew its earlier pledge to avoid hostile action, declaring it “could not and would not guarantee Israel’s security, particularly not against the Palestinian guerrillas.”<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref> Syria further demanded that Israeli forces evacuate the demilitarized zone and hand it over to Syrian control.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref>

Israeli leaders later emphasized that war was not their first choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted on exhausting diplomatic avenues, while Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, summing up internal discussions, stated: ''“I want it to be recorded for history that, before acting, we did everything we could to find a diplomatic solution.”''<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=99}}</ref>

Despite repeated appeals, diplomacy failed to restrain Syrian aggression. This failure, and Syria’s outright defiance, paved the way for a more dangerous phase: coordinated Arab mobilization.

== References ==

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 The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref>
+=== Failed Diplomacy and Syrian Rejection of Restraint ===
+Israel repeatedly turned to diplomatic channels in an effort to curb Syrian aggression. It appealed to the United Nations (UN) Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) and to major powers, including the United States and Britain, seeking intervention to halt persistent Syrian shelling and infiltration.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=157}}</ref> These appeals aimed to stop what Israel described as “incessant Syrian shelling” of kibbutzim and settlements in northern Galilee<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> as well as guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage originating from Syrian territory.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Within a matter of months, Israel submitted approximately 120 complaints to the Security Council regarding these violations.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref>
+Israeli officials also pressed Britain and the United States to persuade UN Secretary-General U Thant to call on Syria to cease its provocations<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=157}}</ref> and urged the Great Powers to issue direct condemnations. Israel even requested that the Soviet Union restrain its Syrian allies.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=158}}</ref>
+Despite these efforts, Damascus not only refused to cooperate but escalated its stance. At a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee (ISMAC), the Syrian delegation withdrew its earlier pledge to avoid hostile action, declaring it “could not and would not guarantee Israel’s security, particularly not against the Palestinian guerrillas.”<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref> Syria further demanded that Israeli forces evacuate the demilitarized zone and hand it over to Syrian control.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref>
+Israeli leaders later emphasized that war was not their first choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted on exhausting diplomatic avenues, while Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, summing up internal discussions, stated: ''“I want it to be recorded for history that, before acting, we did everything we could to find a diplomatic solution.”''<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=99}}</ref>
+Despite repeated appeals, diplomacy failed to restrain Syrian aggression. This failure, and Syria’s outright defiance, paved the way for a more dangerous phase: coordinated Arab mobilization.
 == References ==