User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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Alongside these diplomatic efforts, Syria and its allies employed false reports to inflame tensions. Despite Egyptian General Abdel Fawzi confirming that there were no unusual Israeli troop movements near Syria, Soviet intelligence repeatedly warned that Israel was concentrating eleven to thirteen brigades on the Syrian border, preparing for an attack. These baseless claims, repeated in May 1967, aimed to push Egypt into fulfilling its obligations under the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact and to deter Israel through the threat of a broader Arab coalition.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=187–188}}</ref>

Combined with its push for Egyptian involvement and coordination under the Arab military command, these maneuvers were not defensive but part of a deliberate strategy to heighten confrontation. Syria’s role in regional mobilization and aggressive posture created conditions that made a major war increasingly unavoidable by mid-1967.

=== Israeli Reluctance and Dayan’s Initial Opposition ===

Despite the gravity of Syrian aggression, Israeli leadership initially resisted escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who assumed his post on June 1, 1967, was particularly opposed to launching an offensive against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> He warned that such a move could provoke Soviet intervention and result in heavy Israeli casualties.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> Dayan even suggested relocating ten Israeli settlements away from the border rather than attempting to redraw international boundaries through military force.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=263}}</ref>

Dayan insisted that Israel had “already [reluctantly] conquered enough Arab land and did not need any more”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=261}}</ref> Other ministers, including Zalman Aran, Haim Moshe Shapira, Zorach Warhaftig, and members of Mapam, shared this hesitation.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=261}}</ref> Several even threatened to resign if the air force were used against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Segev|2007|p=200}}</ref>

His proposal to evacuate Israeli settlements was met with fury by other ministers. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that such a move would be tantamount to “conceding parts of Israel [the settlements]” and would constitute a “greater victory for the Syrians”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=276}}</ref> This intense internal debate reveals that the eventual attack on the Golan was not a premeditated land grab, but the outcome of a reluctant and divisive decision-making process.

== References ==

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 Alongside these diplomatic efforts, Syria and its allies employed false reports to inflame tensions. Despite Egyptian General Abdel Fawzi confirming that there were no unusual Israeli troop movements near Syria, Soviet intelligence repeatedly warned that Israel was concentrating eleven to thirteen brigades on the Syrian border, preparing for an attack. These baseless claims, repeated in May 1967, aimed to push Egypt into fulfilling its obligations under the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact and to deter Israel through the threat of a broader Arab coalition.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=187–188}}</ref>
 Combined with its push for Egyptian involvement and coordination under the Arab military command, these maneuvers were not defensive but part of a deliberate strategy to heighten confrontation. Syria’s role in regional mobilization and aggressive posture created conditions that made a major war increasingly unavoidable by mid-1967.
+=== Israeli Reluctance and Dayan’s Initial Opposition ===
+Despite the gravity of Syrian aggression, Israeli leadership initially resisted escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who assumed his post on June 1, 1967, was particularly opposed to launching an offensive against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> He warned that such a move could provoke Soviet intervention and result in heavy Israeli casualties.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> Dayan even suggested relocating ten Israeli settlements away from the border rather than attempting to redraw international boundaries through military force.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=263}}</ref>
+Dayan insisted that Israel had “already [reluctantly] conquered enough Arab land and did not need any more”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=261}}</ref> Other ministers, including Zalman Aran, Haim Moshe Shapira, Zorach Warhaftig, and members of Mapam, shared this hesitation.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=261}}</ref> Several even threatened to resign if the air force were used against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Segev|2007|p=200}}</ref>
+His proposal to evacuate Israeli settlements was met with fury by other ministers. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that such a move would be tantamount to “conceding parts of Israel [the settlements]” and would constitute a “greater victory for the Syrians”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=276}}</ref> This intense internal debate reveals that the eventual attack on the Golan was not a premeditated land grab, but the outcome of a reluctant and divisive decision-making process.
 == References ==