User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

Line 16:

# United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=187}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=620}}</ref> UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>

# American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup”.<ref>{{harv|Bull|1976|p=104}}</ref> Nasser knew about this report<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>

# Egyptian Chief of ~~Staff's~~ direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and personally surveyed the border<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=305}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.<ref>{{harv|El-Gamasy|1993|p=23}}</ref> Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”<ref>{{harv|مظهر|1990|p=110}}</ref>

# Egyptian Chief of Staff’s direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and personally surveyed the border<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=305}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.<ref>{{harv|El-Gamasy|1993|p=23}}</ref> Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”<ref>{{harv|مظهر|1990|p=110}}</ref>

# Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref>

Line 24:

Following the Ba’athist military coup in February 1966, a radical regime rose to power in Damascus.<ref>{{harv|Seale|McConville|1990}}</ref> This government pursued a doctrine of continuous warfare against Israel, advocating guerrilla tactics as a means of circumventing the limitations of conventional Arab armies.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=312}}</ref> Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad exemplified this militant rhetoric, declaring that Syria intended “to saturate this earth with your [Israeli] blood, to throw you into the sea”.<ref>{{harv|Laqueur|1969|p=59}}</ref>

Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and ~~Sha'ar~~ Yishuv.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}</ref> A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref>

Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha’ar Yishuv.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}</ref> A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref>

As the situation deteriorated, Syria intensified shooting and mining activities against Israeli cultivation plots in the demilitarized zones. Employing tank fire and small arms, Syrian forces targeted Israeli tractors and foot patrols and even attempted to introduce shepherds and flocks into these areas to establish new facts on the ground. In two major incidents in January 1967, Israeli tanks destroyed three Syrian tanks during clashes. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin blamed Damascus for these escalations and accused it of severing communication channels with UNTSO, leaving little room for mediation. Rabin made clear that Israel would continue cultivating the contested lands despite Syrian aggression, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the region.

Line 33:

=== Support for Palestinian Guerrilla Activities ===

The radical ~~Ba'athist~~ regime openly advocated a ~~"war~~ of ~~liberation"~~ and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref> Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a ~~"popular~~ war of ~~liberation"~~ to ~~"destroy~~ the Zionist ~~entity"~~ and expel the ~~"Zionist invader"~~.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=27–28}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=182}}</ref> The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}</ref>

The radical Ba’athist regime openly advocated a “war of liberation” and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref> Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a “popular war of liberation” to “destroy the Zionist entity” and expel the “Zionist invader”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=27–28}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=182}}</ref> The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}</ref>

The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged ~~"sabotage~~ operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines," declaring them ~~"legitimate activities"~~ and asserting it had ~~"no~~ intention of doing anything to stop ~~them"~~. On the contrary, Syria vowed to ~~"encourage~~ and promote all such ~~action"~~.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was ~~"not~~ the guardian of ~~Israel's security"~~ and would ~~"do~~ nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its ~~activities"~~. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref>

The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref>

== References ==

@@ Line 16: / Line 16: @@
 # United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=187}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=620}}</ref> UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>
 # American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup”.<ref>{{harv|Bull|1976|p=104}}</ref> Nasser knew about this report<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=309}}</ref>
-# Egyptian Chief of Staff's direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and personally surveyed the border<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=305}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.<ref>{{harv|El-Gamasy|1993|p=23}}</ref> Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”<ref>{{harv|مظهر|1990|p=110}}</ref>
+# Egyptian Chief of Staff’s direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and personally surveyed the border<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=305}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref> and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.<ref>{{harv|El-Gamasy|1993|p=23}}</ref> Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”<ref>{{harv|مظهر|1990|p=110}}</ref>
 # Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref>
@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
 Following the Ba’athist military coup in February 1966, a radical regime rose to power in Damascus.<ref>{{harv|Seale|McConville|1990}}</ref> This government pursued a doctrine of continuous warfare against Israel, advocating guerrilla tactics as a means of circumventing the limitations of conventional Arab armies.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=312}}</ref> Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad exemplified this militant rhetoric, declaring that Syria intended “to saturate this earth with your [Israeli] blood, to throw you into the sea”.<ref>{{harv|Laqueur|1969|p=59}}</ref>
-Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha'ar Yishuv.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}</ref> A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref>
+Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha’ar Yishuv.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}</ref> A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref>
 As the situation deteriorated, Syria intensified shooting and mining activities against Israeli cultivation plots in the demilitarized zones. Employing tank fire and small arms, Syrian forces targeted Israeli tractors and foot patrols and even attempted to introduce shepherds and flocks into these areas to establish new facts on the ground. In two major incidents in January 1967, Israeli tanks destroyed three Syrian tanks during clashes. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin blamed Damascus for these escalations and accused it of severing communication channels with UNTSO, leaving little room for mediation. Rabin made clear that Israel would continue cultivating the contested lands despite Syrian aggression, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the region.
@@ Line 33: / Line 33: @@
 === Support for Palestinian Guerrilla Activities ===
-The radical Ba'athist regime openly advocated a "war of liberation" and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref> Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a "popular war of liberation" to "destroy the Zionist entity" and expel the "Zionist invader".<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=27–28}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=182}}</ref> The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}</ref>
+The radical Ba’athist regime openly advocated a “war of liberation” and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref> Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a “popular war of liberation” to “destroy the Zionist entity” and expel the “Zionist invader”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=27–28}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=182}}</ref> The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}</ref>
-The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged "sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines," declaring them "legitimate activities" and asserting it had "no intention of doing anything to stop them". On the contrary, Syria vowed to "encourage and promote all such action".<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was "not the guardian of Israel's security" and would "do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities". Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref>
+The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref>
 == References ==