User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions
→Syria: add Ceasefire Violations and the Reversal of Policy |
→Syria: add Strategic Necessity of the Golan Offensive |
||
| Line 65: | Line 65: | ||
Earlier, Dayan had stated that he would only approve military action if Syria violated a ceasefire. If the Syrians “continue shelling” despite Israeli restraint, he said, he would support an offensive “to take the entire Heights”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=278}}</ref> The renewed Syrian aggression fulfilled that condition. | Earlier, Dayan had stated that he would only approve military action if Syria violated a ceasefire. If the Syrians “continue shelling” despite Israeli restraint, he said, he would support an offensive “to take the entire Heights”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=278}}</ref> The renewed Syrian aggression fulfilled that condition. | ||
By the early morning of June 9, Israeli intelligence confirmed that Syrian defenses were collapsing and that the strategic town of Kuneitra had been abandoned.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> Confronted with this shift, Dayan reversed his position and ordered the ground assault on the Golan Heights.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> | By the early morning of June 9, Israeli intelligence confirmed that Syrian defenses were collapsing and that the strategic town of Kuneitra had been abandoned.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> Confronted with this shift, Dayan reversed his position and ordered the ground assault on the Golan Heights.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> | ||
=== Strategic Necessity of the Golan Offensive === | |||
From the top of the Golan ridge, Syrians had a perfect view of Israeli territory and excellent firing positions.<ref>{{harv|Rabin|1979|p=52}}</ref> This topographical advantage allowed them to easily and heavily shell Israeli kibbutzim. | |||
Although the General Staff had developed only limited contingency plans for Syria, Dayan expanded the campaign’s scope to ensure long-term security. The new objective was to push Syrian forces back twelve miles,<ref>{{harv|Oren|2017|p=260}}</ref> to remove Israeli settlements from artillery range, by advancing toward Kuneitra and Rafid.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> Dayan and others emphasized that the assault was undertaken to “save our [Israel’s] settlements in northern Galilee from incessant Syrian shelling” and to demonstrate that Syria “could not continue to harass us [Israel] with impunity”.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> | |||
Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights was not conceived as a territorial expansion but as a response to enduring military threats. In this context, capturing the high ground of the Golan was understood as essential to protecting Israeli civilians and removing the topographical advantage that had allowed Syria to threaten them so persistently.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> Furthermore, the Golan was sparsely populated and dominated by military installations, which meant the strategic imperative could be achieved with minimal humanitarian cost. | |||
== References == | == References == | ||