User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions
→Syria: add Strategic Necessity of the Golan Offensive |
fix oren and add syria |
||
| Line 33: | Line 33: | ||
=== Support for Palestinian Guerrilla Activities === | === Support for Palestinian Guerrilla Activities === | ||
The radical Ba’athist regime openly advocated a “war of liberation” and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref> Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a “popular war of liberation” to “destroy the Zionist entity” and expel the “Zionist invader”.<ref>{{harv|Oren| | The radical Ba’athist regime openly advocated a “war of liberation” and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref> Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a “popular war of liberation” to “destroy the Zionist entity” and expel the “Zionist invader”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=27–28}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=182}}</ref> The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}</ref> | ||
The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> | The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=155}}</ref> | ||
| Line 44: | Line 44: | ||
Despite these efforts, Damascus not only refused to cooperate but escalated its stance. At a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee (ISMAC), the Syrian delegation withdrew its earlier pledge to avoid hostile action, declaring it “could not and would not guarantee Israel’s security, particularly not against the Palestinian guerrillas.”<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref> Syria further demanded that Israeli forces evacuate the demilitarized zone and hand it over to Syrian control.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref> | Despite these efforts, Damascus not only refused to cooperate but escalated its stance. At a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee (ISMAC), the Syrian delegation withdrew its earlier pledge to avoid hostile action, declaring it “could not and would not guarantee Israel’s security, particularly not against the Palestinian guerrillas.”<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref> Syria further demanded that Israeli forces evacuate the demilitarized zone and hand it over to Syrian control.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=180}}</ref> | ||
Israeli leaders later emphasized that war was not their first choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted on exhausting diplomatic avenues, while Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, summing up internal discussions, stated: ''“I want it to be recorded for history that, before acting, we did everything we could to find a diplomatic solution.”''<ref>{{harv|Oren| | Israeli leaders later emphasized that war was not their first choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted on exhausting diplomatic avenues, while Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, summing up internal discussions, stated: ''“I want it to be recorded for history that, before acting, we did everything we could to find a diplomatic solution.”''<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=99}}</ref> | ||
Despite repeated appeals, diplomacy failed to restrain Syrian aggression. This failure, and Syria’s outright defiance, paved the way for a more dangerous phase: coordinated Arab mobilization. | Despite repeated appeals, diplomacy failed to restrain Syrian aggression. This failure, and Syria’s outright defiance, paved the way for a more dangerous phase: coordinated Arab mobilization. | ||
| Line 57: | Line 57: | ||
Despite the gravity of Syrian aggression, Israeli leadership initially resisted escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who assumed his post on June 1, 1967, was particularly opposed to launching an offensive against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> He warned that such a move could provoke Soviet intervention and result in heavy Israeli casualties.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> Dayan even suggested relocating ten Israeli settlements away from the border rather than attempting to redraw international boundaries through military force.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=263}}</ref> | Despite the gravity of Syrian aggression, Israeli leadership initially resisted escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who assumed his post on June 1, 1967, was particularly opposed to launching an offensive against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> He warned that such a move could provoke Soviet intervention and result in heavy Israeli casualties.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=204}}</ref> Dayan even suggested relocating ten Israeli settlements away from the border rather than attempting to redraw international boundaries through military force.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=263}}</ref> | ||
Dayan insisted that Israel had “already [reluctantly] conquered enough Arab land and did not need any more”.<ref>{{harv|Oren| | Dayan insisted that Israel had “already [reluctantly] conquered enough Arab land and did not need any more”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=261}}</ref> Other ministers, including Zalman Aran, Haim Moshe Shapira, Zorach Warhaftig, and members of Mapam, shared this hesitation.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=261}}</ref> Several even threatened to resign if the air force were used against Syria.<ref>{{harv|Segev|2007|p=200}}</ref> | ||
His proposal to evacuate Israeli settlements was met with fury by other ministers. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that such a move would be tantamount to “conceding parts of Israel [the settlements]” and would constitute a “greater victory for the Syrians”.<ref>{{harv|Oren| | His proposal to evacuate Israeli settlements was met with fury by other ministers. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that such a move would be tantamount to “conceding parts of Israel [the settlements]” and would constitute a “greater victory for the Syrians”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=276}}</ref> This intense internal debate reveals that the eventual attack on the Golan was not a premeditated land grab, but the outcome of a reluctant and divisive decision-making process. | ||
=== Ceasefire Violations and the Reversal of Policy === | === Ceasefire Violations and the Reversal of Policy === | ||
On June 8, Dayan continued to resist calls for an attack on Syria.<ref>{{harv|Oren| | On June 8, Dayan continued to resist calls for an attack on Syria.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=261}}; {{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=263}}; {{harv|Morris|1999|p=325}}</ref> However, events shifted rapidly that night. Egypt accepted a ceasefire, and Syria soon followed suit. Yet within four hours, Syrian forces had broken the ceasefire by shelling sixteen Israeli villages.<ref>{{harv|Lall|1968|p=72}}</ref> | ||
Earlier, Dayan had stated that he would only approve military action if Syria violated a ceasefire. If the Syrians “continue shelling” despite Israeli restraint, he said, he would support an offensive “to take the entire Heights”.<ref>{{harv|Oren| | Earlier, Dayan had stated that he would only approve military action if Syria violated a ceasefire. If the Syrians “continue shelling” despite Israeli restraint, he said, he would support an offensive “to take the entire Heights”.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=278}}</ref> The renewed Syrian aggression fulfilled that condition. | ||
By the early morning of June 9, Israeli intelligence confirmed that Syrian defenses were collapsing and that the strategic town of Kuneitra had been abandoned.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> Confronted with this shift, Dayan reversed his position and ordered the ground assault on the Golan Heights.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> | By the early morning of June 9, Israeli intelligence confirmed that Syrian defenses were collapsing and that the strategic town of Kuneitra had been abandoned.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> Confronted with this shift, Dayan reversed his position and ordered the ground assault on the Golan Heights.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> | ||
| Line 69: | Line 69: | ||
From the top of the Golan ridge, Syrians had a perfect view of Israeli territory and excellent firing positions.<ref>{{harv|Rabin|1979|p=52}}</ref> This topographical advantage allowed them to easily and heavily shell Israeli kibbutzim. | From the top of the Golan ridge, Syrians had a perfect view of Israeli territory and excellent firing positions.<ref>{{harv|Rabin|1979|p=52}}</ref> This topographical advantage allowed them to easily and heavily shell Israeli kibbutzim. | ||
Although the General Staff had developed only limited contingency plans for Syria, Dayan expanded the campaign’s scope to ensure long-term security. The new objective was to push Syrian forces back twelve miles,<ref>{{harv|Oren| | Although the General Staff had developed only limited contingency plans for Syria, Dayan expanded the campaign’s scope to ensure long-term security. The new objective was to push Syrian forces back twelve miles,<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=260}}</ref> to remove Israeli settlements from artillery range, by advancing toward Kuneitra and Rafid.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> Dayan and others emphasized that the assault was undertaken to “save our [Israel’s] settlements in northern Galilee from incessant Syrian shelling” and to demonstrate that Syria “could not continue to harass us [Israel] with impunity”.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=380}}</ref> | ||
Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights was not conceived as a territorial expansion but as a response to enduring military threats. In this context, capturing the high ground of the Golan was understood as essential to protecting Israeli civilians and removing the topographical advantage that had allowed Syria to threaten them so persistently.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> Furthermore, the Golan was sparsely populated and dominated by military installations, which meant the strategic imperative could be achieved with minimal humanitarian cost. | Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights was not conceived as a territorial expansion but as a response to enduring military threats. In this context, capturing the high ground of the Golan was understood as essential to protecting Israeli civilians and removing the topographical advantage that had allowed Syria to threaten them so persistently.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> Furthermore, the Golan was sparsely populated and dominated by military installations, which meant the strategic imperative could be achieved with minimal humanitarian cost. | ||
== Jordan == | |||
=== Introduction: Israel Did Not Seek War With Jordan === | |||
Israel generally sought to avoid war with Jordan in 1967, prioritizing the Egyptian front and not wishing to get involved in a three-front war.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=404}}; {{harv|Morris|1999|p=321}}; {{harv|Rodman|2000|p=128}}</ref> There was a longstanding paradox in Israel’s relationship with Jordan, as Israel had an interest in Jordanian stability.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=312}}</ref> Prior to the Six-Day War, Israeli military planning and strategy were primarily geared towards a conflict with Egypt, with the IDF intending to remain on the defensive against Jordan and Syria until the Egyptian army had been destroyed.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=321}}</ref> | |||
=== Diplomatic Attempts to Prevent War === | |||
The Israeli government, including Prime Minister Eshkol and his military authorities, made concerted efforts to prevent Jordanian military involvement. After the first They used various channels, including friendly states, the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, and General Odd Bull in Jerusalem, to convey explicit assurances to King Hussein that Israel would abstain from any attack if Jordan and its government stayed out of the war.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=405}}</ref> Eshkol communicated directly to King Hussein through General Bull, stating, “We shall not initiate any action whatsoever against Jordan. However, should Jordan open hostilities, we shall react with all our might, and the King will have to bear the full responsibility for all the consequences.”<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=406}}</ref> Similarly, General Rabin had assured King Hussein that Israel had no wish for war with Jordan.<ref>{{harv|Levitan|2025|p=8}}</ref> These efforts were explicitly supported by Israel’s military authorities.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=405}}</ref> | |||
=== Not only talks — Israel’s actions reflected their position === | |||
The position in the requests and talks with Jordan reflected in a desire to respect existing agreements and avoid provocations, as was seen in the Israeli policies prior to the war. In 1967, the cabinet decided unanimously to keep the 1967 Independence Day parade (15 May) in Jerusalem strictly within the limits prescribed by the armistice agreement with Jordan, despite Jordanian violations that included denying entry of Jews to the holiest site in Judaism.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=319–320}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=53}}; {{harv|Segev|2007|p=218}}</ref> Israeli leaders initially considered Jordanian artillery fire on Jerusalem on June 5, 1967, as a “salvo to uphold Jordanian honor” rather than a full-scale offensive,<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=408}}</ref> sending a second note to the King to desist.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> At this point, Israel still had no intention of attacking the West Bank, and their deployment was purely defensive.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> Notably, “no one in the cabinet or the general staff had proposed the capture of the Old City before the Jordanian bombardment began,” and even then, Israel was reluctant to advance into that holy part of the Jewish patrimony.<ref>{{harv|Naor|2006|p=406}}</ref> Defense Minister Dayan reportedly ordered a defensive approach, seeking to encircle Jerusalem without entering the Old City, saying ‘We don’t need that Vatican’.<ref>{{harv|Naor|2006|p=406}}</ref> All troops in the area were there for defensive purposes exclusively<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> and had strict orders to not take any act that could be considered “offensive” (not even patrol!).<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191–192}}</ref> | |||
The situation for the Israelis had become dire. From the ridge near Government House, Jordanian troops had a clear path to sweep through southern Jerusalem—Talpiot, Katamon, and San Simon—and potentially join forces with units and tanks coming down from Mount Scopus in the north. The fall of the entire city was a real possibility.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=190}}</ref> Meanwhile, on the West Bank, Iraq’s 8th Mechanized Brigade—bolstered by a Palestinian battalion—was advancing toward the Damiya Bridge, taking over the positions previously manned by the 40th Armored Brigade. With seven Jordanian brigades already in the area, the combined forces posed a serious threat of slicing Israel in two<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=190}}</ref> | |||
== References == | == References == | ||