User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions
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Dayan, upon becoming Defense Minister, expanded “Kardom” to include Sharm el-Sheikh and made the destruction of enemy forces the primary aim, changing the underlying conception from limited to total war.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=259}}</ref> On June 2, Dayan gave his opinion in a cabinet meeting: | Dayan, upon becoming Defense Minister, expanded “Kardom” to include Sharm el-Sheikh and made the destruction of enemy forces the primary aim, changing the underlying conception from limited to total war.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=259}}</ref> On June 2, Dayan gave his opinion in a cabinet meeting: | ||
{{Blockquote|quotetext= | |||
{{Blockquote|quotetext=|cite=|text=I said that we should launch a military attack without delay. If the Cabinet should make such a decision at its next scheduled session on Sunday, June 4, we should strike the next morning. The aim of our action should be to destroy the Egyptian forces concentrated in central Sinai. We should have no geographical aim whatsoever and we should not include the Gaza Strip in our fighting plans - unless, as was threatened, Iraqi troops entered and occupied it.<ref>{{harv|Dayan|1976|p=339}}</ref>|source=Moshe Dayan speech to Cabinet, June 2}} | |||
In a meeting, Dayan also instructed not to occupy the Gaza Strip and to not reach the Suez Canal, as it was an international waterway.<ref>{{harv|Rabin|1979|p=98}}; {{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=259}}</ref> | In a meeting, Dayan also instructed not to occupy the Gaza Strip and to not reach the Suez Canal, as it was an international waterway.<ref>{{harv|Rabin|1979|p=98}}; {{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=259}}</ref> | ||
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The decision to capture the West Bank evolved in stages, dictated by military developments rather than a political master plan.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=262}}; {{harv|Naor|2006|p=407}}</ref> Initially, the IDF thrust into the West Bank without a clear plan for conquering the entire territory.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=322}}</ref> | The decision to capture the West Bank evolved in stages, dictated by military developments rather than a political master plan.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=262}}; {{harv|Naor|2006|p=407}}</ref> Initially, the IDF thrust into the West Bank without a clear plan for conquering the entire territory.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=322}}</ref> | ||
After Israeli intelligence reported King Hussein ordered his troops to withdraw from the West Bank, the IDF’s objective was updated to “capture the West Bank and safeguard the descents to the Jordan”.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=261–262}}; {{harv|Naor|2006|p=407}}</ref> | After Israeli intelligence reported King Hussein ordered his troops to withdraw from the West Bank, the IDF’s objective was updated to “capture the West Bank and safeguard the descents to the Jordan”.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=261–262}}; {{harv|Naor|2006|p=407}}</ref> | ||
== Egypt == | == Egypt == | ||
Nasser knew. He knew the soviet warnings of troop concentration near Syria are false. Here are everyone who told him so: | Nasser knew. He knew the soviet warnings of troop concentration near Syria are false. Here are everyone who told him so: | ||