User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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== Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran ==

=== Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers ===

On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=608}}</ref> At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border.<ref>{{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do.<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=311}}; {{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip”.<ref>{{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Segev|2007|p=227}}</ref> This withdrawal “fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade”<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=302}}</ref> and posed a “strategic threat to Israel”.

=== Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran ===

Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Popp|2006|p=285}}; {{harv|Yemini|2017|p=249}}</ref> Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|Louis|2012|p=224}}</ref> The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|Louis|2012|p=27}}</ref> This move was widely regarded by Israel, the US and the “international community” as a '''casus belli'''<ref>{{harv|Bregman|2016|p=393}}; {{harv|Mattar|2005|p=31}}; {{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Fraser|2018|p=81}}; {{harv|Cattan|1969|p=103}}; {{harv|Zipperstein|2024|p=272}}; {{harv|ربيع|2022|p=296}}; {{harv|Barker|2023|p=18}}; {{harv|حبيب|2002|p=132}}; {{harv|أحمد|1993|p=62}}; {{harv|Shemesh|2008|p=118}}; {{harv|Ruys|2010|p=277}}; {{harv|شلش|2023|p=568}}; {{harv|Kubic|2017|p=145}}; {{harv|Abu-Jaber|1968|p=13}}; {{harv|Petersen|Bowett|1971|p=20}}; {{harv|Medzini|2020|p=134}}; {{harv|Knorr|Morgan|p=135}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=611}}; {{harv|Aronson|2000|p=92}}; {{harv|Levitan|2025|p=8}}; {{harv|Harris|1983|p=312}}; {{harv|Shalom|2008|p=381}}; {{harv|Sandler|Hartley|2003|p=370}}; {{harv|Gat|2013|p=615}}; {{harv|Gluska|2007|p=153}}; {{harv|Evron|2005|p=44}}; {{harv|Aronson|2010|p=338}}; {{harv|Affairs|1967|p=58}}; {{harv|Rikhye|2013|p=80}}; {{harv|Gelpi|2010|p=141}}; {{harv|Govrin|2013|p=313}}; {{harv|Hay|2012|p=69}}; {{harv|Rabinovich|2009|p=21}}; {{harv|Hinnebusch|2015}}; {{harv|Sandler|2017|p=100}}; {{harv|Relations|1975|p=8–9}}; {{harv|Teveth|1969|p=19}}; {{harv|Hammond|Alexander|1972|p=149}}; {{harv|Bar-Siman-Tov|1987|p=97}}; {{harv|Sela|2002|p=284}}; {{harv|Arad|Smernoff|1975}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |year=2007 |title=The Sinai Campaign and after |encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia Judaica |publisher=Macmillan Reference US |url=https://archive.org/details/encyclopaedia-judaica-v.-09-her-int/Encyclopaedia%20Judaica%2C%20v.%2002%20%28Alr-Az%29_2/ |edition=Second |volume=10 |pages= |isbn=978-0-02-865928-2}}</ref> an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable”.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}</ref> Nasser, in his speech on May 29, went even further with this act that already legally justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}</ref>

=== Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances ===

Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were deployed along the border with Israel.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=302}}</ref> This significant buildup, compared to less than one division previously,<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=617}}</ref> represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=617}}</ref> Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref>

=== The Economic Burden ===

Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref> In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.

== References ==

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-== Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran ==
+=== Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers ===
+On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=608}}</ref> At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border.<ref>{{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do.<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=311}}; {{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip”.<ref>{{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Segev|2007|p=227}}</ref> This withdrawal “fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade”<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=302}}</ref> and posed a “strategic threat to Israel”.
+=== Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran ===
 Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Popp|2006|p=285}}; {{harv|Yemini|2017|p=249}}</ref> Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|Louis|2012|p=224}}</ref> The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|Louis|2012|p=27}}</ref> This move was widely regarded by Israel, the US and the “international community” as a '''casus belli'''<ref>{{harv|Bregman|2016|p=393}}; {{harv|Mattar|2005|p=31}}; {{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Fraser|2018|p=81}}; {{harv|Cattan|1969|p=103}}; {{harv|Zipperstein|2024|p=272}}; {{harv|ربيع|2022|p=296}}; {{harv|Barker|2023|p=18}}; {{harv|حبيب|2002|p=132}}; {{harv|أحمد|1993|p=62}}; {{harv|Shemesh|2008|p=118}}; {{harv|Ruys|2010|p=277}}; {{harv|شلش|2023|p=568}}; {{harv|Kubic|2017|p=145}}; {{harv|Abu-Jaber|1968|p=13}}; {{harv|Petersen|Bowett|1971|p=20}}; {{harv|Medzini|2020|p=134}}; {{harv|Knorr|Morgan|p=135}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=611}}; {{harv|Aronson|2000|p=92}}; {{harv|Levitan|2025|p=8}}; {{harv|Harris|1983|p=312}}; {{harv|Shalom|2008|p=381}}; {{harv|Sandler|Hartley|2003|p=370}}; {{harv|Gat|2013|p=615}}; {{harv|Gluska|2007|p=153}}; {{harv|Evron|2005|p=44}}; {{harv|Aronson|2010|p=338}}; {{harv|Affairs|1967|p=58}}; {{harv|Rikhye|2013|p=80}}; {{harv|Gelpi|2010|p=141}}; {{harv|Govrin|2013|p=313}}; {{harv|Hay|2012|p=69}}; {{harv|Rabinovich|2009|p=21}}; {{harv|Hinnebusch|2015}}; {{harv|Sandler|2017|p=100}}; {{harv|Relations|1975|p=8–9}}; {{harv|Teveth|1969|p=19}}; {{harv|Hammond|Alexander|1972|p=149}}; {{harv|Bar-Siman-Tov|1987|p=97}}; {{harv|Sela|2002|p=284}}; {{harv|Arad|Smernoff|1975}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |year=2007 |title=The Sinai Campaign and after |encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia Judaica |publisher=Macmillan Reference US |url=https://archive.org/details/encyclopaedia-judaica-v.-09-her-int/Encyclopaedia%20Judaica%2C%20v.%2002%20%28Alr-Az%29_2/ |edition=Second |volume=10 |pages= |isbn=978-0-02-865928-2}}</ref> an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable”.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}</ref> Nasser, in his speech on May 29,  went even further with this act that already legally justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}</ref>
+=== Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances ===
+Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were deployed along the border with Israel.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=302}}</ref> This significant buildup, compared to less than one division previously,<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=617}}</ref> represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=617}}</ref> Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref>
+=== The Economic Burden ===
+Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref> In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.
 == References ==