User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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The position in the requests and talks with Jordan reflected in a desire to respect existing agreements and avoid provocations, as was seen in the Israeli policies prior to the war. In 1967, the cabinet decided unanimously to keep the 1967 Independence Day parade (15 May) in Jerusalem strictly within the limits prescribed by the armistice agreement with Jordan, despite Jordanian violations that included denying entry of Jews to the holiest site in Judaism.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=319–320}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=53}}; {{harv|Segev|2007|p=218}}</ref> Israeli leaders initially considered Jordanian artillery fire on Jerusalem on June 5, 1967, as a “salvo to uphold Jordanian honor” rather than a full-scale offensive,<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=408}}</ref> sending a second note to the King to desist.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> At this point, Israel still had no intention of attacking the West Bank, and their deployment was purely defensive.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> Notably, “no one in the cabinet or the general staff had proposed the capture of the Old City before the Jordanian bombardment began,” and even then, Israel was reluctant to advance into that holy part of the Jewish patrimony.<ref>{{harv|Naor|2006|p=406}}</ref> Defense Minister Dayan reportedly ordered a defensive approach, seeking to encircle Jerusalem without entering the Old City, saying ‘We don’t need that Vatican’.<ref>{{harv|Naor|2006|p=406}}</ref> All troops in the area were there for defensive purposes exclusively<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> and had strict orders to not take any act that could be considered “offensive” (not even patrol!).<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191–192}}</ref>

The situation for the Israelis had become dire. From the ridge near Government House, Jordanian troops had a clear path to sweep through southern Jerusalem—Talpiot, Katamon, and San Simon—and potentially join forces with units and tanks coming down from Mount Scopus in the north. The fall of the entire city was a real possibility.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=190}}</ref> Meanwhile, on the West Bank, Iraq’s 8th Mechanized Brigade—bolstered by a Palestinian battalion—was advancing toward the Damiya Bridge, taking over the positions previously manned by the 40th Armored Brigade. With seven Jordanian brigades already in the area, the combined forces posed a serious threat of slicing Israel in two<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=190}}</ref>

But when the Jordanian shelling intensified, not only in Jerusalem but along the entire border, and when troops of the Jordanian army occupied UN headquarters at Government House, the former residence of British High Commissioners, the Israelis realized that the Jordanians were not just putting on a show, and the war began in earnest.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=192}}</ref> That’s when Israel started attacking Jordan.

== References ==

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 The position in the requests and talks with Jordan reflected in a desire to respect existing agreements and avoid provocations, as was seen in the Israeli policies prior to the war. In 1967, the cabinet decided unanimously to keep the 1967 Independence Day parade (15 May) in Jerusalem strictly within the limits prescribed by the armistice agreement with Jordan, despite Jordanian violations that included denying entry of Jews to the holiest site in Judaism.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=319–320}}; {{harv|Oren|2002|p=53}}; {{harv|Segev|2007|p=218}}</ref> Israeli leaders initially considered Jordanian artillery fire on Jerusalem on June 5, 1967, as a “salvo to uphold Jordanian honor” rather than a full-scale offensive,<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=408}}</ref> sending a second note to the King to desist.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> At this point, Israel still had no intention of attacking the West Bank, and their deployment was purely defensive.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> Notably, “no one in the cabinet or the general staff had proposed the capture of the Old City before the Jordanian bombardment began,” and even then, Israel was reluctant to advance into that holy part of the Jewish patrimony.<ref>{{harv|Naor|2006|p=406}}</ref> Defense Minister Dayan reportedly ordered a defensive approach, seeking to encircle Jerusalem without entering the Old City, saying ‘We don’t need that Vatican’.<ref>{{harv|Naor|2006|p=406}}</ref> All troops in the area were there for defensive purposes exclusively<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191}}</ref> and had strict orders to not take any act that could be considered “offensive” (not even patrol!).<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=191–192}}</ref>
 The situation for the Israelis had become dire. From the ridge near Government House, Jordanian troops had a clear path to sweep through southern Jerusalem—Talpiot, Katamon, and San Simon—and potentially join forces with units and tanks coming down from Mount Scopus in the north. The fall of the entire city was a real possibility.<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=190}}</ref> Meanwhile, on the West Bank, Iraq’s 8th Mechanized Brigade—bolstered by a Palestinian battalion—was advancing toward the Damiya Bridge, taking over the positions previously manned by the 40th Armored Brigade. With seven Jordanian brigades already in the area, the combined forces posed a serious threat of slicing Israel in two<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=190}}</ref>
+But when the Jordanian shelling intensified, not only in Jerusalem but along the entire border, and when troops of the Jordanian army occupied UN headquarters at Government House, the former residence of British High Commissioners, the Israelis realized that the Jordanians were not just putting on a show, and the war began in earnest.<ref>{{harv|Kimche|Bawley|1968|p=192}}</ref> That’s when Israel started attacking Jordan.
 == References ==