User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 21:03, 24 July 2025

Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers

On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.^[1] At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border.^[2] In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do.^[3] On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip”.^[4] General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21.^[5] This withdrawal “fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade”^[6] and posed a “strategic threat to Israel”.

Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran

Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat.^[7] Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply.^[8] The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving.^[9] This move was widely regarded by Israel, the US and the “international community” as a casus belli^[10]^[11] an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable”.^[12] Nasser, in his speech on May 29, went even further with this act that already legally justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.^[13]

Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances

Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were deployed along the border with Israel.^[14] This significant buildup, compared to less than one division previously,^[15] represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units.^[16] Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.^[17]

The Economic Burden

Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.^[18] In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.^[19] In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.^[20] It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.

References

↑ (Gat 2005, p. 608)
↑ (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
↑ (Yost 1968, p. 311); (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
↑ (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Segev 2007, p. 227)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 302)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Popp 2006, p. 285); (Yemini 2017, p. 249)
↑ (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 224)
↑ (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 27)
↑ (Bregman 2016, p. 393); (Mattar 2005, p. 31); (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Fraser 2018, p. 81); (Cattan 1969, p. 103); (Zipperstein 2024, p. 272); (ربيع 2022, p. 296); (Barker 2023, p. 18); (حبيب 2002, p. 132); (أحمد 1993, p. 62); (Shemesh 2008, p. 118); (Ruys 2010, p. 277); (شلش 2023, p. 568); (Kubic 2017, p. 145); (Abu-Jaber 1968, p. 13); (Petersen & Bowett 1971, p. 20); (Medzini 2020, p. 134); (Knorr & Morgan, p. 135); (Gat 2005, p. 611); (Aronson 2000, p. 92); (Levitan 2025, p. 8); (Harris 1983, p. 312); (Shalom 2008, p. 381); (Sandler & Hartley 2003, p. 370); (Gat 2013, p. 615); (Gluska 2007, p. 153); (Evron 2005, p. 44); (Aronson 2010, p. 338); (Affairs 1967, p. 58); (Rikhye 2013, p. 80); (Gelpi 2010, p. 141); (Govrin 2013, p. 313); (Hay 2012, p. 69); (Rabinovich 2009, p. 21); (Hinnebusch 2015); (Sandler 2017, p. 100); (Relations 1975, p. 8–9); (Teveth 1969, p. 19); (Hammond & Alexander 1972, p. 149); (Bar-Siman-Tov 1987, p. 97); (Sela 2002, p. 284); (Arad & Smernoff 1975)
↑ "The Sinai Campaign and after". Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. 10 (Second ed.). Macmillan Reference US. 2007. ISBN 978-0-02-865928-2.
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 302)
↑ (Gat 2005, p. 617)
↑ (Gat 2005, p. 617)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 309)
↑ (Morris 1999, p. 309)
↑ (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)
↑ (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)

Biliography

Affairs, New Zealand Department of External (1967). External Affairs Review. Department of External Affairs.
Abu-Jaber, Kamel (1968). The Arab World. Arab Information Center.
ربيع, د حامد (2022). نظرية الأمن القومي العربي والتطور المعاصر للتعامل الدولي في منطقة الشرق الأوسط (in Arabic). مركز الحضارة للدراسات والبحوث.
Arad, Uzi B.; Smernoff, Barry J. (1975). American Security and the International Energy Situation: Final Report. National Technical Information Service.
Aronson, Shlomo (May 2000). "Israel's nuclear programme, the six day war and its ramifications". Israel Affairs. 6 (3–4): 83–95. doi:10.1080/13537120008719573. ISSN 1353-7121.
Aronson, Shlomo (2010-11-01). David Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Renaissance. Translated by Greenwood, Naftali (1 ed.). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511762437. ISBN 978-0-521-19748-9.
Barker, Anthony J. (2023). US Foreign Service Women in the Middle East and Islamic North Africa, 1945-2001 (1st ed.). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-031-46756-1.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov (1987). Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East. Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-92396-9.
Petersen, Kristen; Bowett, Derek (1971). Proposal for Establishment of an International Council for Research and Information on Conflicts. Statens Trykningskontor. ISBN 978-87-503-1059-4. (Originally published by Northwestern University)
Bregman, Ahron (2016). Israel's wars: a history since 1947 (4th ed.). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon New York, N.Y: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-29637-9.
Cattan, Henry (1969). Palestine, the Arabs and Israel: the search for justice. London: Longmans. ISBN 978-0-582-78000-2.
Dayan, Moshe (1976). Moshe Dayan: story of my life. New York: Morrow. ISBN 978-0-688-03076-6.
Six Days in 1967 ... operational art in the Sinai., Defense Technical Information Center, 12 February 1996
Eban, Abba Solomon (1977). Abba Eban: an autobiography (1st ed.). New York: Random House. ISBN 978-0-394-49302-2.
Evron, Yair (2014-06-03). Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Routledge Revivals) (0 ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315823393. ISBN 978-1-317-83174-7.
Ferris, Jesse (2012). Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-16343-7.
Fraser, Thomas (2018). The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1st ed.). London: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-137-38745-5.
Gat, Moshe (December 2005). "Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated Strategy or An Inexorable Drift to War?". Israel Affairs. 11 (4): 608–635. doi:10.1080/13537120500233714. ISSN 1353-7121.
{{Cite journal |last=Gat |first=Moshe |date=1 October 2013 |title=Anatomy of decline: Anglo-Soviet competition in the Middle East, 1956–67 |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537121.2013.829610 |journal=Israel Affairs |language=en |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=603–622 |doi=10.1080/13537121.2013.829610 |issn=1353-7121}
Gelpi, Christopher (2010-01-10). The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-14671-3.
Gluska, Ami (2007-02-12). The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War (1st ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203965962. ISBN 978-1-134-16377-9.
Goldstein, Yossi (2018-09-03). "The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted". Israel Affairs. 24 (5): 767–784. doi:10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475. ISSN 1353-7121.
Govrin, Yosef (2013). Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-1967: From Confrontation to Disruption. Cummings Center Series. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. ISBN 978-1-135-25662-3.
Hammond, Paul Y.; Alexander, Sidney Stuart (1972). Political Dynamics in the Middle East. American Elsevier Publishing Company. ISBN 978-0-444-00110-8.
Harris, David John (1983). Cases and Materials on International Law. Sweet & Maxwell. ISBN 978-0-421-29270-3.
Hay, Jeff (2012). The Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. Perspectives on Modern World History Ser. New York, NY: Greenhaven Publishing LLC. ISBN 978-0-7377-6799-5.
Kanovsky, E. (1968). "The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War". Middle East Journal. 22 (2): 131–143. ISSN 0026-3141.
Kimche, David; Bawley, Dan (1968). The sandstorm: the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967: prelude and aftermath. Stein and Day.
Knorr, Klaus Eugen; Morgan, Patrick M. Strategic Military Surprise: Iniciatives and Opportunities. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-4128-3521-3.
Kubic, Milan J. (2017). From Prague to Jerusalem: An Uncommon Journey of a Journalist. Northern Illinois University Press. ISBN 978-0-87580-764-5.
Lall, Arthur Samuel (1970). The UN and the Middle East crisis, 1967. A Columbia paperback, 103. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-08635-6.
Laqueur, Walter (1969). The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967/8. Penguin.
Hinnebusch, Raymond (1 July 2015). The international politics of the Middle East: Second edition. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-1-78499-202-6.
Levitan, Nir (2025-05-04). "In the eye of the storm: Odd Bull and the outbreak of the 1967 war". Israel Affairs. 31 (3): 404–415. doi:10.1080/13537121.2025.2495411. ISSN 1353-7121.
Mattar, Philip (2005). Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-0-8160-6986-6.
Medzini, Meron (2020). Golda Meir: a reference guide to her life and works. Significant figures in world history. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-5381-2288-4.
Morris, Benny (1999). Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-1999 (1st ed.). New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-0-679-42120-7.
Naor, Arye (July 2006). "Civil–Military Relations and Strategic Goal Setting in the Six Day War". Israel Affairs. 12 (3): 395–411. doi:10.1080/13537120600744610. ISSN 1353-7121.
Oren, Michael B. (2002). Six days of war: June 1967 and the making of the modern Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-515174-9.
Popp, Roland (2006). "Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War". Middle East Journal. 60 (2): 281–309. ISSN 0026-3141.
Rabin, Yitzhak; Rabin, Yitzhak (1979). The Rabin memoirs. Herman Wouk Collection (Library of Congress) (1st English ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 978-0-316-73002-0.
Rabinovich, Itamar (2009-07-01). The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-2265-2.
Relations, Universiṭah ha-ʻIvrit bi-Yerushalayim Leonard Davis Institute for International (1975). Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems.
Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (2013). The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. ISBN 978-1-136-27978-2.
Rodman, David (March 2000). "Patterns of war initiation in the Arab‐Israeli conflict: A note on the military dimension". Israel Affairs. 6 (3–4): 115–128. doi:10.1080/13537120008719575. ISSN 1353-7121.
Ruys, Tom (2010-11-25). 'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-49483-0.
Sādāt, Anwar as- (1978). In search of identity: an autobiography (1st ed.). New York: Harper & Row. ISBN 978-0-06-013742-7.
Sandler, Shmuel (2017-09-18). The Jewish Origins of Israeli Foreign Policy: A Study in Tradition and Survival (1 ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315194998. ISBN 978-1-315-19499-8.
Sandler, Todd; Hartley, Keith (2003). The Economics of Conflict: Case studies. Edward Elgar. ISBN 978-1-84064-782-2.
Seale, Patrick (1989). Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-06667-0.
Śegev, Tom (2007). 1967: Israel, the war, and the year that transformed the Middle East (1st American ed.). New York, NY: Metropolitan Books. ISBN 978-0-8050-7057-6.
Sela, Avraham (2002-09-05). Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East: Revised and Updated Edition. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-0-8264-1413-7.
Shalom, Zaki (April 2008). "Israel's Foreign Minister Eban meets President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Wilson on the Eve of the Six Day War". Israel Affairs. 14 (2): 277–287. doi:10.1080/13537120801900276. ISSN 1353-7121.
Shemesh, Mosheh (2008). Arab politics, Palestinian nationalism and the Six Day War: the crystallization of Arab strategy and Nasir's descent to war, 1957-1967. Brighton Portland: Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-83624-047-1.
Shlaim, Avi (2014-10-20). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (Updated and Expanded). W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-35101-9.
Teveth, Shabtai (1969). The Tanks of Tammuz. Viking Press. ISBN 978-0-670-69368-9.
Yemini, Ben-Dror (2017). Industry of Lies: Media, Academia, and the Israeli-Arab Conflict. Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy. ISBN 978-1-9790-6143-8.
Zipperstein, Steven E. (2024). The legal case for Palestine: a critical assessment. Ucla center for middle east development (cmed). Abingdon, Oxon [UK] New York, NY: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-040-09178-4.
أحمد, رفعت سيد (1993). الصراع المائي: الأبعاد الكاملة للصراع حول الماء بين العرب و إسرائيل : الداقع د المستقبل (in Arabic). دار الهدا،. ISBN 978-977-5340-04-7.
عبد الغني الجمسي, محمد (1990). مذكرات الجمسي: حرب اكتوبر 1973 (الطبعة 1 ed.). المانشورات الشرقية.
حديدي, صلاح الدين (1974). شاهد على حرب 67 (in Arabic). دار الشروق،.
شلش, بلال محمد (2023). شيءٌ عابر...: نابلس تحت الاحتلال (حزيران/ يونيو 1967 - آذار/ مارس 1969) - مذكرات ووثائق حمدي طاهر كنعان (in Arabic). المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات. ISBN 978-614-445-553-1.
حديدي, صلاح الدين (1984). شاهد على حرب اليمن (الطبعة 1 ed.). مكتبة مدبولي،. ISBN 978-977-13-3028-8.
فوزي, محمد (1983). حرب الثلاث سنوات، 1967/1970 :‏ ‏مذكرات الفريق أول محمد فوزي، وزير الحربية الأسبق (الطبعة 1 ed.). ‏دار المستقبل العربي.
حبيب, كميل (2002). السلم الإسرائيلي المسلح في أساسه وأهدافه (in Arabic). المؤسسة الحديثة للكتاب.
Murtaji, ʻAbd al-Muhsin Kamil (1976). الفريق مرتجي يروي الحقائق: قائد جبهة سيناء في حرب 1967 (in Arabic). الوطن العربي،.
مظهر, سليمان (1990). اعترافات قادة حرب يونيو : نصوص شهاداتهم امام لجنة تسجيل تاريخ الثورة (in Arabic). دار الحرية للصحافة والطباعة والنشر.
"The Sinai Campaign and after". Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. 10 (Second ed.). Macmillan Reference US. 2007. ISBN 978-0-02-865928-2.

[1] (Gat 2005, p. 608)

[2] (Shalom 2008, p. 278)

[3] (Yost 1968, p. 311); (Shalom 2008, p. 278)

[4] (Shalom 2008, p. 278)

[5] (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Segev 2007, p. 227)

[6] (Morris 1999, p. 302)

[7] (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Popp 2006, p. 285); (Yemini 2017, p. 249)

[8] (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 224)

[9] (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 27)

[10] (Bregman 2016, p. 393); (Mattar 2005, p. 31); (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Fraser 2018, p. 81); (Cattan 1969, p. 103); (Zipperstein 2024, p. 272); (ربيع 2022, p. 296); (Barker 2023, p. 18); (حبيب 2002, p. 132); (أحمد 1993, p. 62); (Shemesh 2008, p. 118); (Ruys 2010, p. 277); (شلش 2023, p. 568); (Kubic 2017, p. 145); (Abu-Jaber 1968, p. 13); (Petersen & Bowett 1971, p. 20); (Medzini 2020, p. 134); (Knorr & Morgan, p. 135); (Gat 2005, p. 611); (Aronson 2000, p. 92); (Levitan 2025, p. 8); (Harris 1983, p. 312); (Shalom 2008, p. 381); (Sandler & Hartley 2003, p. 370); (Gat 2013, p. 615); (Gluska 2007, p. 153); (Evron 2005, p. 44); (Aronson 2010, p. 338); (Affairs 1967, p. 58); (Rikhye 2013, p. 80); (Gelpi 2010, p. 141); (Govrin 2013, p. 313); (Hay 2012, p. 69); (Rabinovich 2009, p. 21); (Hinnebusch 2015); (Sandler 2017, p. 100); (Relations 1975, p. 8–9); (Teveth 1969, p. 19); (Hammond & Alexander 1972, p. 149); (Bar-Siman-Tov 1987, p. 97); (Sela 2002, p. 284); (Arad & Smernoff 1975)

[11] "The Sinai Campaign and after". Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. 10 (Second ed.). Macmillan Reference US. 2007. ISBN 978-0-02-865928-2.

[12] (Morris 1999, p. 306)

[13] (Morris 1999, p. 306)

[14] (Morris 1999, p. 302)

[15] (Gat 2005, p. 617)

[16] (Gat 2005, p. 617)

[17] (Morris 1999, p. 309)

[18] (Morris 1999, p. 309)

[19] (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)

[20] (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-== Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran ==
+=== Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers ===
+On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=608}}</ref> At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border.<ref>{{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do.<ref>{{harv|Yost|1968|p=311}}; {{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip”.<ref>{{harv|Shalom|2008|p=278}}</ref> General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Segev|2007|p=227}}</ref> This withdrawal “fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade”<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=302}}</ref> and posed a “strategic threat to Israel”.
+=== Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran ===
 Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Popp|2006|p=285}}; {{harv|Yemini|2017|p=249}}</ref> Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|Louis|2012|p=224}}</ref> The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|Louis|2012|p=27}}</ref> This move was widely regarded by Israel, the US and the “international community” as a '''casus belli'''<ref>{{harv|Bregman|2016|p=393}}; {{harv|Mattar|2005|p=31}}; {{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}; {{harv|Fraser|2018|p=81}}; {{harv|Cattan|1969|p=103}}; {{harv|Zipperstein|2024|p=272}}; {{harv|ربيع|2022|p=296}}; {{harv|Barker|2023|p=18}}; {{harv|حبيب|2002|p=132}}; {{harv|أحمد|1993|p=62}}; {{harv|Shemesh|2008|p=118}}; {{harv|Ruys|2010|p=277}}; {{harv|شلش|2023|p=568}}; {{harv|Kubic|2017|p=145}}; {{harv|Abu-Jaber|1968|p=13}}; {{harv|Petersen|Bowett|1971|p=20}}; {{harv|Medzini|2020|p=134}}; {{harv|Knorr|Morgan|p=135}}; {{harv|Gat|2005|p=611}}; {{harv|Aronson|2000|p=92}}; {{harv|Levitan|2025|p=8}}; {{harv|Harris|1983|p=312}}; {{harv|Shalom|2008|p=381}}; {{harv|Sandler|Hartley|2003|p=370}}; {{harv|Gat|2013|p=615}}; {{harv|Gluska|2007|p=153}}; {{harv|Evron|2005|p=44}}; {{harv|Aronson|2010|p=338}}; {{harv|Affairs|1967|p=58}}; {{harv|Rikhye|2013|p=80}}; {{harv|Gelpi|2010|p=141}}; {{harv|Govrin|2013|p=313}}; {{harv|Hay|2012|p=69}}; {{harv|Rabinovich|2009|p=21}}; {{harv|Hinnebusch|2015}}; {{harv|Sandler|2017|p=100}}; {{harv|Relations|1975|p=8–9}}; {{harv|Teveth|1969|p=19}}; {{harv|Hammond|Alexander|1972|p=149}}; {{harv|Bar-Siman-Tov|1987|p=97}}; {{harv|Sela|2002|p=284}}; {{harv|Arad|Smernoff|1975}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |year=2007 |title=The Sinai Campaign and after |encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia Judaica |publisher=Macmillan Reference US |url=https://archive.org/details/encyclopaedia-judaica-v.-09-her-int/Encyclopaedia%20Judaica%2C%20v.%2002%20%28Alr-Az%29_2/ |edition=Second |volume=10 |pages= |isbn=978-0-02-865928-2}}</ref> an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable”.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}</ref> Nasser, in his speech on May 29,  went even further with this act that already legally justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=306}}</ref>
+=== Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances ===
+Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were deployed along the border with Israel.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=302}}</ref> This significant buildup, compared to less than one division previously,<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=617}}</ref> represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2005|p=617}}</ref> Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref>
+=== The Economic Burden ===
+Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=309}}</ref> In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.<ref>{{harv|Kanovsky|1968|p=135}}</ref> It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.
 == References ==