User:Project Herzl/Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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# Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref>

== Syria ==

=== Rising Tensions on the Syrian Front ===

Following the Ba’athist military coup in February 1966, a radical regime rose to power in Damascus.<ref>{{harv|Seale|McConville|1990}}</ref> This government pursued a doctrine of continuous warfare against Israel, advocating guerrilla tactics as a means of circumventing the limitations of conventional Arab armies.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=312}}</ref> Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad exemplified this militant rhetoric, declaring that Syria intended “to saturate this earth with your [Israeli] blood, to throw you into the sea”.<ref>{{harv|Laqueur|1969|p=59}}</ref>

Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha'ar Yishuv.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}</ref> A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref>

As the situation deteriorated, Syria intensified shooting and mining activities against Israeli cultivation plots in the demilitarized zones. Employing tank fire and small arms, Syrian forces targeted Israeli tractors and foot patrols and even attempted to introduce shepherds and flocks into these areas to establish new facts on the ground. In two major incidents in January 1967, Israeli tanks destroyed three Syrian tanks during clashes. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin blamed Damascus for these escalations and accused it of severing communication channels with UNTSO, leaving little room for mediation. Rabin made clear that Israel would continue cultivating the contested lands despite Syrian aggression, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the region.

Tensions on the Syrian front were fueled in part by disputes over water resources. Israel’s National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, diverted water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert, an essential project for expanding Israeli agriculture and settlement in arid regions. Roughly half of the Jordan River’s waters come from the Banias and Hazbani rivers flowing from Syria and Lebanon, and the other half from the Dan River within Israel. Control over these sources was crucial; former Mekorot director and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol emphasized that without water, there could be no agriculture, and without agriculture, the Zionist vision for a sustainable Jewish state could not be realized.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref>

Syria sought to undermine Israel’s vital water supply by attempting to divert the Jordan River’s headwaters within its territory. When Israeli patrols operated near Kibbutz Dan to protect water sources, Syrian forces opened fire, leading to repeated confrontations. These clashes escalated to artillery, tank fire, and ultimately Israeli air strikes. Syria’s aggressive actions over water resources significantly increased tensions and compelled Israel to defend its critical water infrastructure.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}; {{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref>

== References ==

@@ Line 19: / Line 19: @@
 # Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”<ref>{{harv|Oren|2002|p=64}}</ref>
+== Syria ==
+=== Rising Tensions on the Syrian Front ===
+Following the Ba’athist military coup in February 1966, a radical regime rose to power in Damascus.<ref>{{harv|Seale|McConville|1990}}</ref> This government pursued a doctrine of continuous warfare against Israel, advocating guerrilla tactics as a means of circumventing the limitations of conventional Arab armies.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=312}}</ref> Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad exemplified this militant rhetoric, declaring that Syria intended “to saturate this earth with your [Israeli] blood, to throw you into the sea”.<ref>{{harv|Laqueur|1969|p=59}}</ref>
+Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha'ar Yishuv.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}</ref> A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.<ref>{{harv|Eban|1977|p=421}}; {{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref> British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.<ref>{{harv|Gat|2003|p=82}}</ref>
+As the situation deteriorated, Syria intensified shooting and mining activities against Israeli cultivation plots in the demilitarized zones. Employing tank fire and small arms, Syrian forces targeted Israeli tractors and foot patrols and even attempted to introduce shepherds and flocks into these areas to establish new facts on the ground. In two major incidents in January 1967, Israeli tanks destroyed three Syrian tanks during clashes. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin blamed Damascus for these escalations and accused it of severing communication channels with UNTSO, leaving little room for mediation. Rabin made clear that Israel would continue cultivating the contested lands despite Syrian aggression, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the region.
+Tensions on the Syrian front were fueled in part by disputes over water resources. Israel’s National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, diverted water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert, an essential project for expanding Israeli agriculture and settlement in arid regions. Roughly half of the Jordan River’s waters come from the Banias and Hazbani rivers flowing from Syria and Lebanon, and the other half from the Dan River within Israel. Control over these sources was crucial; former Mekorot director and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol emphasized that without water, there could be no agriculture, and without agriculture, the Zionist vision for a sustainable Jewish state could not be realized.<ref>{{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref>
+Syria sought to undermine Israel’s vital water supply by attempting to divert the Jordan River’s headwaters within its territory. When Israeli patrols operated near Kibbutz Dan to protect water sources, Syrian forces opened fire, leading to repeated confrontations. These clashes escalated to artillery, tank fire, and ultimately Israeli air strikes. Syria’s aggressive actions over water resources significantly increased tensions and compelled Israel to defend its critical water infrastructure.<ref>{{harv|Morris|1999|p=303}}; {{harv|Shlaim|2014|p=243}}</ref>
 == References ==