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The Causes of The War

Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers

On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.[1] At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border.[2] In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do.[3] On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip”.[4] General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21.[5] This withdrawal “fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade”[6] and posed a “strategic threat to Israel”.

Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran

Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat.[7] Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply.[8] The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving.[9] This move was widely regarded by Israel, the US and the “international community” as a casus belli[10][11] an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable”.[12] Nasser, in his speech on May 29,  went even further with this act that already legally justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.[13]

Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances

Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were deployed along the border with Israel.[14] This significant buildup, compared to less than one division previously,[15] represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units.[16] Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.[17]

The Economic Burden

Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.[18] In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.[19] In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.[20] It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.

Egypt

Nasser knew. He knew the soviet warnings of troop concentration near Syria are false. Here are everyone who told him so:

  1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.[21] UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”[22]
  2. American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup”.[23] Nasser knew about this report[24]
  3. Egyptian Chief of Staff’s direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani[25] and personally surveyed the border[26] and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.[27] Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”[28]
  4. Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”[29]

Syria

Rising Tensions on the Syrian Front

Following the Ba’athist military coup in February 1966, a radical regime rose to power in Damascus.[30] This government pursued a doctrine of continuous warfare against Israel, advocating guerrilla tactics as a means of circumventing the limitations of conventional Arab armies.[31] Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad exemplified this militant rhetoric, declaring that Syria intended “to saturate this earth with your [Israeli] blood, to throw you into the sea”.[32]

Throughout 1966 and into 1967, Syrian artillery emplacements in the Golan Heights routinely shelled Israeli communities in the Galilee, including Dan, Dafna, and Sha’ar Yishuv.[33] A further Syrian advance of just five kilometers would have brought key Israeli roads to Safed and Haifa under threat, placing much of the Upper Galilee and Jordan Valley within artillery range.[34] British officials acknowledged Syria’s “clear topographical advantage,” warning that Israeli kibbutzim were “sitting ducks” on the plains below Syrian gun positions, and that only large-scale action, or an air strike, could neutralize the threat.[35]

As the situation deteriorated, Syria intensified shooting and mining activities against Israeli cultivation plots in the demilitarized zones. Employing tank fire and small arms, Syrian forces targeted Israeli tractors and foot patrols and even attempted to introduce shepherds and flocks into these areas to establish new facts on the ground. In two major incidents in January 1967, Israeli tanks destroyed three Syrian tanks during clashes. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin blamed Damascus for these escalations and accused it of severing communication channels with UNTSO, leaving little room for mediation. Rabin made clear that Israel would continue cultivating the contested lands despite Syrian aggression, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the region.

Tensions on the Syrian front were fueled in part by disputes over water resources. Israel’s National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, diverted water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert, an essential project for expanding Israeli agriculture and settlement in arid regions. Roughly half of the Jordan River’s waters come from the Banias and Hazbani rivers flowing from Syria and Lebanon, and the other half from the Dan River within Israel. Control over these sources was crucial; former Mekorot director and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol emphasized that without water, there could be no agriculture, and without agriculture, the Zionist vision for a sustainable Jewish state could not be realized.[36]

Syria sought to undermine Israel’s vital water supply by attempting to divert the Jordan River’s headwaters within its territory. When Israeli patrols operated near Kibbutz Dan to protect water sources, Syrian forces opened fire, leading to repeated confrontations. These clashes escalated to artillery, tank fire, and ultimately Israeli air strikes. Syria’s aggressive actions over water resources significantly increased tensions and compelled Israel to defend its critical water infrastructure.[37]

Support for Palestinian Guerrilla Activities

The radical Ba’athist regime openly advocated a “war of liberation” and actively supported Palestinian guerrilla activities and raids into Israel.[38] Syrian leaders, including Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, Syria’s figurehead president, Syria’s minister of defense, Hafez al Asad, and minister of propaganda, Mouhamed al Zuebi, publicly committed to a “popular war of liberation” to “destroy the Zionist entity” and expel the “Zionist invader”.[39] The Syrian regime openly supported Fatah and other fedayeen groups, providing bases, training, and weapons.[40]

The Syrian government publicly embraced and encouraged “sabotage operations and acts of terrorism, including the sowing of mines,” declaring them “legitimate activities” and asserting it had “no intention of doing anything to stop them”. On the contrary, Syria vowed to “encourage and promote all such action”.[41] Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuyin explicitly stated that Syria was “not the guardian of Israel’s security” and would “do nothing to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Movement from carrying out its activities”. Moreover, Zuyin warned, if Israel dared to take any action in response, Syria would turn the region into a battlefield.[42]

Failed Diplomacy and Syrian Rejection of Restraint

Israel repeatedly turned to diplomatic channels in an effort to curb Syrian aggression. It appealed to the United Nations (UN) Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) and to major powers, including the United States and Britain, seeking intervention to halt persistent Syrian shelling and infiltration.[43] These appeals aimed to stop what Israel described as “incessant Syrian shelling” of kibbutzim and settlements in northern Galilee[44] as well as guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage originating from Syrian territory.[45] Within a matter of months, Israel submitted approximately 120 complaints to the Security Council regarding these violations.[46]

Israeli officials also pressed Britain and the United States to persuade UN Secretary-General U Thant to call on Syria to cease its provocations[47] and urged the Great Powers to issue direct condemnations. Israel even requested that the Soviet Union restrain its Syrian allies.[48]

Despite these efforts, Damascus not only refused to cooperate but escalated its stance. At a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Committee (ISMAC), the Syrian delegation withdrew its earlier pledge to avoid hostile action, declaring it “could not and would not guarantee Israel’s security, particularly not against the Palestinian guerrillas.”[49] Syria further demanded that Israeli forces evacuate the demilitarized zone and hand it over to Syrian control.[50]

Israeli leaders later emphasized that war was not their first choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted on exhausting diplomatic avenues, while Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, summing up internal discussions, stated: “I want it to be recorded for history that, before acting, we did everything we could to find a diplomatic solution.”[51]

Despite repeated appeals, diplomacy failed to restrain Syrian aggression. This failure, and Syria’s outright defiance, paved the way for a more dangerous phase: coordinated Arab mobilization.

Syrian Mobilization and Regional Escalation

Building on its earlier provocations, Syria moved beyond border harassment and guerrilla sponsorship, pressing for full-scale confrontation. it worked to turn local clashes into a wider Arab-Israeli confrontation. On May 26, 1967, at a summit of Arab leaders, Syria demanded the creation of a unified Arab air force to counter Israel’s air superiority. It insisted that any Israeli military action be met with a massive, “blistering” response, regardless of where the original incident occurred, leaving operational decisions to the United Arab Command. Syria also urged Egypt to expel the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai and Gaza and replace it with Egyptian troops, an unmistakable call for escalation. To pressure Egypt further, Syrian representatives accused Cairo of “cowering behind the United Nations’ skirts.”[52] Alongside these diplomatic efforts, Syria and its allies employed false reports to inflame tensions. Despite Egyptian General Abdel Fawzi confirming that there were no unusual Israeli troop movements near Syria, Soviet intelligence repeatedly warned that Israel was concentrating eleven to thirteen brigades on the Syrian border, preparing for an attack. These baseless claims, repeated in May 1967, aimed to push Egypt into fulfilling its obligations under the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact and to deter Israel through the threat of a broader Arab coalition.[53] Combined with its push for Egyptian involvement and coordination under the Arab military command, these maneuvers were not defensive but part of a deliberate strategy to heighten confrontation. Syria’s role in regional mobilization and aggressive posture created conditions that made a major war increasingly unavoidable by mid-1967.

Israeli Reluctance and Dayan’s Initial Opposition

Despite the gravity of Syrian aggression, Israeli leadership initially resisted escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who assumed his post on June 1, 1967, was particularly opposed to launching an offensive against Syria.[54] He warned that such a move could provoke Soviet intervention and result in heavy Israeli casualties.[55] Dayan even suggested relocating ten Israeli settlements away from the border rather than attempting to redraw international boundaries through military force.[56] Dayan insisted that Israel had “already [reluctantly] conquered enough Arab land and did not need any more”.[57] Other ministers, including Zalman Aran, Haim Moshe Shapira, Zorach Warhaftig, and members of Mapam, shared this hesitation.[58] Several even threatened to resign if the air force were used against Syria.[59] His proposal to evacuate Israeli settlements was met with fury by other ministers. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol argued that such a move would be tantamount to “conceding parts of Israel [the settlements]” and would constitute a “greater victory for the Syrians”.[60] This intense internal debate reveals that the eventual attack on the Golan was not a premeditated land grab, but the outcome of a reluctant and divisive decision-making process.

Ceasefire Violations and the Reversal of Policy

On June 8, Dayan continued to resist calls for an attack on Syria.[61] However, events shifted rapidly that night. Egypt accepted a ceasefire, and Syria soon followed suit. Yet within four hours, Syrian forces had broken the ceasefire by shelling sixteen Israeli villages.[62] Earlier, Dayan had stated that he would only approve military action if Syria violated a ceasefire. If the Syrians “continue shelling” despite Israeli restraint, he said, he would support an offensive “to take the entire Heights”.[63] The renewed Syrian aggression fulfilled that condition. By the early morning of June 9, Israeli intelligence confirmed that Syrian defenses were collapsing and that the strategic town of Kuneitra had been abandoned.[64] Confronted with this shift, Dayan reversed his position and ordered the ground assault on the Golan Heights.[65]

Strategic Necessity of the Golan Offensive

From the top of the Golan ridge, Syrians had a perfect view of Israeli territory and excellent firing positions.[66] This topographical advantage allowed them to easily and heavily shell Israeli kibbutzim. Although the General Staff had developed only limited contingency plans for Syria, Dayan expanded the campaign’s scope to ensure long-term security. The new objective was to push Syrian forces back twelve miles,[67] to remove Israeli settlements from artillery range, by advancing toward Kuneitra and Rafid.[68] Dayan and others emphasized that the assault was undertaken to “save our [Israel’s] settlements in northern Galilee from incessant Syrian shelling” and to demonstrate that Syria “could not continue to harass us [Israel] with impunity”.[69] Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights was not conceived as a territorial expansion but as a response to enduring military threats. In this context, capturing the high ground of the Golan was understood as essential to protecting Israeli civilians and removing the topographical advantage that had allowed Syria to threaten them so persistently.[70] Furthermore, the Golan was sparsely populated and dominated by military installations, which meant the strategic imperative could be achieved with minimal humanitarian cost.

Jordan

Introduction: Israel Did Not Seek War With Jordan

Israel generally sought to avoid war with Jordan in 1967, prioritizing the Egyptian front and not wishing to get involved in a three-front war.[71] There was a longstanding paradox in Israel’s relationship with Jordan, as Israel had an interest in Jordanian stability.[72] Prior to the Six-Day War, Israeli military planning and strategy were primarily geared towards a conflict with Egypt, with the IDF intending to remain on the defensive against Jordan and Syria until the Egyptian army had been destroyed.[73]

Diplomatic Attempts to Prevent War

The Israeli government, including Prime Minister Eshkol and his military authorities, made concerted efforts to prevent Jordanian military involvement. After the first They used various channels, including friendly states, the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, and General Odd Bull in Jerusalem, to convey explicit assurances to King Hussein that Israel would abstain from any attack if Jordan and its government stayed out of the war.[74] Eshkol communicated directly to King Hussein through General Bull, stating, “We shall not initiate any action whatsoever against Jordan. However, should Jordan open hostilities, we shall react with all our might, and the King will have to bear the full responsibility for all the consequences.”[75] Similarly, General Rabin had assured King Hussein that Israel had no wish for war with Jordan.[76] These efforts were explicitly supported by Israel’s military authorities.[77]

Not only talks — Israel’s actions reflected their position

The position in the requests and talks with Jordan reflected in a desire to respect existing agreements and avoid provocations, as was seen in the Israeli policies prior to the war. In 1967, the cabinet decided unanimously to keep the 1967 Independence Day parade (15 May) in Jerusalem strictly within the limits prescribed by the armistice agreement with Jordan, despite Jordanian violations that included denying entry of Jews to the holiest site in Judaism.[78] Israeli leaders initially considered Jordanian artillery fire on Jerusalem on June 5, 1967, as a “salvo to uphold Jordanian honor” rather than a full-scale offensive,[79] sending a second note to the King to desist.[80] At this point, Israel still had no intention of attacking the West Bank, and their deployment was purely defensive.[81] Notably, “no one in the cabinet or the general staff had proposed the capture of the Old City before the Jordanian bombardment began,” and even then, Israel was reluctant to advance into that holy part of the Jewish patrimony.[82] Defense Minister Dayan reportedly ordered a defensive approach, seeking to encircle Jerusalem without entering the Old City, saying ‘We don’t need that Vatican’.[83] All troops in the area were there for defensive purposes exclusively[84] and had strict orders to not take any act that could be considered “offensive” (not even patrol!).[85]

The situation for the Israelis had become dire. From the ridge near Government House, Jordanian troops had a clear path to sweep through southern Jerusalem—Talpiot, Katamon, and San Simon—and potentially join forces with units and tanks coming down from Mount Scopus in the north. The fall of the entire city was a real possibility.[86] Meanwhile, on the West Bank, Iraq’s 8th Mechanized Brigade—bolstered by a Palestinian battalion—was advancing toward the Damiya Bridge, taking over the positions previously manned by the 40th Armored Brigade. With seven Jordanian brigades already in the area, the combined forces posed a serious threat of slicing Israel in two[87]

But when the Jordanian shelling intensified, not only in Jerusalem but along the entire border, and when troops of the Jordanian army occupied UN headquarters at Government House, the former residence of British High Commissioners, the Israelis realized that the Jordanians were not just putting on a show, and the war began in earnest.[88] That’s when Israel started attacking Jordan.

References

  1. ↑ (Gat 2005, p. 608)
  2. ↑ (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
  3. ↑ (Yost 1968, p. 311); (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
  4. ↑ (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
  5. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Segev 2007, p. 227)
  6. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 302)
  7. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Popp 2006, p. 285); (Yemini 2017, p. 249)
  8. ↑ (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 224)
  9. ↑ (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 27)
  10. ↑ (Bregman 2016, p. 393); (Mattar 2005, p. 31); (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Fraser 2018, p. 81); (Cattan 1969, p. 103); (Zipperstein 2024, p. 272); (ربيع 2022, p. 296); (Barker 2023, p. 18); (حبيب 2002, p. 132); (أحمد 1993, p. 62); (Shemesh 2008, p. 118); (Ruys 2010, p. 277); (شلش 2023, p. 568); (Kubic 2017, p. 145); (Abu-Jaber 1968, p. 13); (Petersen & Bowett 1971, p. 20); (Medzini 2020, p. 134); (Knorr & Morgan, p. 135); (Gat 2005, p. 611); (Aronson 2000, p. 92); (Levitan 2025, p. 8); (Harris 1983, p. 312); (Shalom 2008, p. 381); (Sandler & Hartley 2003, p. 370); (Gat 2013, p. 615); (Gluska 2007, p. 153); (Evron 2005, p. 44); (Aronson 2010, p. 338); (Affairs 1967, p. 58); (Rikhye 2013, p. 80); (Gelpi 2010, p. 141); (Govrin 2013, p. 313); (Hay 2012, p. 69); (Rabinovich 2009, p. 21); (Hinnebusch 2015); (Sandler 2017, p. 100); (Relations 1975, p. 8–9); (Teveth 1969, p. 19); (Hammond & Alexander 1972, p. 149); (Bar-Siman-Tov 1987, p. 97); (Sela 2002, p. 284); (Arad & Smernoff 1975)
  11. ↑ "The Sinai Campaign and after". Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. 10 (Second ed.). Macmillan Reference US. 2007. ISBN 978-0-02-865928-2.
  12. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306)
  13. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 306)
  14. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 302)
  15. ↑ (Gat 2005, p. 617)
  16. ↑ (Gat 2005, p. 617)
  17. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 309)
  18. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 309)
  19. ↑ (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)
  20. ↑ (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)
  21. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 187); (Gat 2005, p. 620)
  22. ↑ (Yost 1968, p. 309)
  23. ↑ (Bull 1976, p. 104)
  24. ↑ (Yost 1968, p. 309)
  25. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 64)
  26. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 305); (Oren 2002, p. 64)
  27. ↑ (El-Gamasy 1993, p. 23)
  28. ↑ (مظهر 1990, p. 110)
  29. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 64)
  30. ↑ (Seale & McConville 1990)
  31. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 312)
  32. ↑ (Laqueur 1969, p. 59)
  33. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 421)
  34. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 421); (Gat 2003, p. 82)
  35. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 82)
  36. ↑ (Shlaim 2014, p. 243)
  37. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 303); (Shlaim 2014, p. 243)
  38. ↑ (Shlaim 2014, p. 243)
  39. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 27–28); (Gat 2003, p. 182)
  40. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 303)
  41. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 155)
  42. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 155)
  43. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 157)
  44. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 82)
  45. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 155)
  46. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 180)
  47. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 157)
  48. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 158)
  49. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 180)
  50. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 180)
  51. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 99)
  52. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 116)
  53. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 187–188)
  54. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 204)
  55. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 204)
  56. ↑ (Shlaim 2014, p. 263)
  57. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 261)
  58. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 261)
  59. ↑ (Segev 2007, p. 200)
  60. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 276)
  61. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 261); (Shlaim 2014, p. 263); (Morris 1999, p. 325)
  62. ↑ (Lall 1968, p. 72)
  63. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 278)
  64. ↑ (Dayan 1976, p. 380)
  65. ↑ (Dayan 1976, p. 380)
  66. ↑ (Rabin 1979, p. 52)
  67. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 260)
  68. ↑ (Dayan 1976, p. 380)
  69. ↑ (Dayan 1976, p. 380)
  70. ↑ (Gat 2003, p. 82)
  71. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 404); (Morris 1999, p. 321); (Rodman 2000, p. 128)
  72. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 312)
  73. ↑ (Morris 1999, p. 321)
  74. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 405)
  75. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 406)
  76. ↑ (Levitan 2025, p. 8)
  77. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 405)
  78. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 319–320); (Oren 2002, p. 53); (Segev 2007, p. 218)
  79. ↑ (Eban 1977, p. 408)
  80. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 191)
  81. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 191)
  82. ↑ (Naor 2006, p. 406)
  83. ↑ (Naor 2006, p. 406)
  84. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 191)
  85. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 191–192)
  86. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 190)
  87. ↑ (Oren 2002, p. 190)
  88. ↑ (Kimche & Bawley 1968, p. 192)

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