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The Causes of The War

Egypt’s Expulsion of UN Peacekeepers

On May 16, 1967, Nasser demanded withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.[1] At first, the United Nations interpreted the demand as one that didn’t require a complete withdrawal from Sinai, but only from strategic points along the border.[2] In order to clarify, they had a few meetings with Egyptian officials. Despite that, it remained unclear what was the peacekeeping force demanded to do.[3] On May 18, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmud Riad, clarified to the UN secretary-general (General U Thant) that “Egypt was determined to terminate the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza strip”.[4] General Thant quickly acceded to this demand, and UNEF withdrew by May 20-21.[5] This withdrawal “fatally undermined the order that had assured relative tranquility for a decade”[6] and posed a “strategic threat to Israel”.

Egypt’s blockade of the straits of Tiran

Around noon on May 22, Nasser announced that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to “all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials” to Eilat.[7] Those “strategic goods” included, amongst other things, oil shipments from Iran, which constituted 90% of Israel’s overall oil supply.[8] The blockade prevented all oil shipments from arriving.[9] This move was widely regarded by Israel, the US and the “international community” as a casus belli[10][11] an act or situation provoking or justifying war. It was seen as the “decisive act that made war inevitable”.[12] Nasser, in his speech on May 29,  went even further with this act that already legally justified war, and stated that the issue was Israel’s “existence,” not merely the Straits of Tiran.[13]

Egypt’s Massive Troop Movements and Alliances

Starting May 14, Egyptian divisions, totaling approximately 100,000 troops with 800-900 tanks and over 700 artillery pieces, were deployed along the border with Israel.[14] This significant buildup, compared to less than one division previously,[15] represented a major strategic challenge and forced Israel to mobilize a lot of reserve units.[16] Back in November 1966, Egypt entered into a bilateral defense treaty with Syria. Four days before Israel eventually decided to launch the war, Egypt signed a similar defense agreement with Jordan. Following the agreement, on the next day, Jordan allowed Iraqi troops to deploy in Jordan, creating a seemingly united Arab front against Israel.[17]

The Economic Burden

Due to Egypt’s escalations, specially the massive deployment, Israel was forced to mobilize a large number reserve units, indefinitely disrupting its economy.[18] In the Arab states, mobilization involves a tiny fraction of the labor force.[19] In Israel, due to its much smaller population, one in four workers were mobilized and could not work.[20] It is needless to stress just how much strain and stress this placed on the Israeli economy, and as a consequence, on the government, to solve the situation.

Egypt

Nasser knew. He knew the soviet warnings of troop concentration near Syria are false. Here are everyone who told him so:

  1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) reports: General Odd Bull, who was the Head of the UNTSO, issued a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, which unequivocally stated that there was no evidence of Israeli force concentrations on either side of the Israeli-Syrian border.[21] UN Secretary-General U Thant said “Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line”[22]
  2. American military intelligence: Lieutenant Commander L.P. Blasch, the American military attaché stationed in northern Israel, reported that “We have no reports, thus far, of any buildup”.[23] Nasser knew about this report[24]
  3. Egyptian Chief of Staff's direct observation and report: General Mouhamad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, was sent to Damascus to verify persistent Syrian complaints about Israeli troop concentrations. Fawzi closely studied aerial photos of the border with Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmad Suweidani[25] and personally surveyed the border[26] and found no sign of IDF concentrations anywhere. He later recalled “I did not find any concrete evidence to support the information received. On the contrary, aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal [Israeli] military positions”.[27] Upon his return, Fawzi reported directly to Nasser “There is nothing there. No massing of forces. Nothing.”[28]
  4. Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence assessment: Chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, who sent several Israeli Arabs to reconnoiter Northern Galilee said “There are no force concentrations. Nor is there justification, tactical or strategic, for such concentrations.”[29]


References

  1. (Gat 2005, p. 608)
  2. (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
  3. (Yost 1968, p. 311); (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
  4. (Shalom 2008, p. 278)
  5. (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Segev 2007, p. 227)
  6. (Morris 1999, p. 302)
  7. (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Popp 2006, p. 285); (Yemini 2017, p. 249)
  8. (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 224)
  9. (Shlaim & Louis 2012, p. 27)
  10. (Bregman 2016, p. 393); (Mattar 2005, p. 31); (Morris 1999, p. 306); (Fraser 2018, p. 81); (Cattan 1969, p. 103); (Zipperstein 2024, p. 272); (ربيع 2022, p. 296); (Barker 2023, p. 18); (حبيب 2002, p. 132); (أحمد 1993, p. 62); (Shemesh 2008, p. 118); (Ruys 2010, p. 277); (شلش 2023, p. 568); (Kubic 2017, p. 145); (Abu-Jaber 1968, p. 13); (Petersen & Bowett 1971, p. 20); (Medzini 2020, p. 134); (Knorr & Morgan, p. 135); (Gat 2005, p. 611); (Aronson 2000, p. 92); (Levitan 2025, p. 8); (Harris 1983, p. 312); (Shalom 2008, p. 381); (Sandler & Hartley 2003, p. 370); (Gat 2013, p. 615); (Gluska 2007, p. 153); (Evron 2005, p. 44); (Aronson 2010, p. 338); (Affairs 1967, p. 58); (Rikhye 2013, p. 80); (Gelpi 2010, p. 141); (Govrin 2013, p. 313); (Hay 2012, p. 69); (Rabinovich 2009, p. 21); (Hinnebusch 2015); (Sandler 2017, p. 100); (Relations 1975, p. 8–9); (Teveth 1969, p. 19); (Hammond & Alexander 1972, p. 149); (Bar-Siman-Tov 1987, p. 97); (Sela 2002, p. 284); (Arad & Smernoff 1975)
  11. "The Sinai Campaign and after". Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. 10 (Second ed.). Macmillan Reference US. 2007. ISBN 978-0-02-865928-2.
  12. (Morris 1999, p. 306)
  13. (Morris 1999, p. 306)
  14. (Morris 1999, p. 302)
  15. (Gat 2005, p. 617)
  16. (Gat 2005, p. 617)
  17. (Morris 1999, p. 309)
  18. (Morris 1999, p. 309)
  19. (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)
  20. (Kanovsky 1968, p. 135)
  21. (Gat 2003, p. 187); (Gat 2005, p. 620)
  22. (Yost 1968, p. 309)
  23. (Bull 1976, p. 104)
  24. (Yost 1968, p. 309)
  25. (Oren 2002, p. 64)
  26. (Morris 1999, p. 305); (Oren 2002, p. 64)
  27. (El-Gamasy 1993, p. 23)
  28. (مظهر 1990, p. 110)
  29. (Oren 2002, p. 64)

Biliography

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